Nowadays, one rarely sees references to L. V. Kantorovich's economic model. Apparently, the reason is that either those who are in power and determine the economic policy in our country do not need mathematical economics at all, or this model and the underlying theory disagrees with the official neoliberal ideology professed by these people.
shortest way and with minimum losses, optimal and balanced plan targets, determined and coordinated by the state. It is clear that capitalist companies do not need such state-determined prices. Moreover, they would be regarded as an illegal interference of the state into private business, an attempt to take away or restrict their right to decide about production, prices, investment, etc. That is why, although in the West Kantorovich was recognized as a genius, his ideas were uncalled-for at the macroeconomic level. Below we consider conditions under which Kantorovich's model yet could be used in the modern Russian economy.
T. Koopmans also expressed the opinion that the distribution of resources in a competitive economy can be regarded as solving a huge problem of linear programming, yet not by means of mathematical computations, but by successive approximation to equilibrium optimum via the activity of independent market agents. Moreover, he believed that such a model can provide a basis for a rigorous formulation of general equilibrium theory (see [4, p. 257] ). But not for its practical application as a tool for macroeconomic planning.
At the same time, many western authors believed that the live mechanism of free competition is better than any model of mathematical economics for a number of reasons. The market covers all participants without exception, which cannot be done by any model. The market reflects constant changes in real life which no model can keep track of. The calculation of optimal prices for the whole variety of commodities, production, and consumption would require enormous statistical data, so that the cost of collecting and processing this data might exceed the benefits obtained from the optimal plan. Finally, it is not at all obvious that the companies, being governed by the optimal prices, would strictly conform to the rules leading to optimum. That is, a large bureaucracy would be required for controlling them.
One can object to this, first of all, that the free market neither leads to optimum automatically, but only under the strictly determined conditions of perfect competition, when there are no obstacles to competition, resources move freely to their most efficient uses, and market agents possess complete information necessary for decision making. In such an economy,
• the marginal rates of substitution between any two goods for consumers are equal to the marginal rates of transformation between these goods for producers;
• the marginal production costs of all goods are equal to their marginal prices;
• the relative prices of all goods are equal to the quotients of their marginal costs. Note that these equilibrium conditions presuppose the equality of profitability rates in all sectors and the absence of super-profits, as well as the equality of the relative prices of producers and consumers. Obviously, these conditions are not satisfied in real life, neither in highly developed capitalist countries, nor still less in modern Russia.
Meanwhile, as was rigorously proved by western economic science, for the resource allocation to be optimal, the conditions of perfect competition must be fulfilled in absolutely all sectors. Since actually no market economy satisfies these conditions, there is no optimum. Moreover, according to the western theory, one cannot prove that even a certain extension of the sphere of free competition in modern mixed, i.e., imperfect, market systems, such as liquidation of some monopolies, improvement of information, more complete accounting of social costs, advances the economy toward optimum. There are special papers of the Nobel Prize laureates K. Arrow and J. Stiglitz on this subject (see [5] , [6, pp. 122-126] ). Therefore, apparently, one cannot prove that the equilibrium state of the economy calculated according to Kantorovich's model will be necessarily worse than the equilibrium achieved spontaneously by the market mechanism. Thus Kantorovich's method was uncalled-for in the West not because of its theoretical inadequacy, but because it was rejected by the institutional structure of the western economy.
It is all the more significant that Kantorovich's conception was highly appreciated by western science just as an achievement in economics. It was not just a chance that he shared the Nobel Prize with the mathematical economist Koopmans, but not with the pure mathematician Dantzig. Moreover, presenting the Soviet and American economists at the Nobel Prize ceremony in Stockholm, the Swedish professor Ragnar Bentzel especially emphasized the universal importance of Kantorovich's conception for any economy regardless of its socio-political form: "As the supply of productive resources is limited, everywhere, all societies are confronted by a series of questions concerning the optimal use of available resources and the fair distribution of income among citizens. Such normative questions can be treated in a scientific manner that is independent of the political organization of the society under consideration." This universality was the most valuable aspect of Kantorovich's theory for the western scientific community. Now let us turn to the question of why Kantorovich's model was not accepted at the same macroeconomic level in the Soviet planned economy, which apparently provided objective conditions for its realization.
First let us note that it would be incorrect to say that his theory was not accepted at all. For several years I worked at the Institute for Economics and Industrial Engineering, Siberian Branch of Academy of Sciences, and I know for certain that since the 1960s the institute developed optimization models of sectoral and regional level, not only in theory but for practical applications. Optimization problems of macroeconomic level were dealt with at the Economic Institute and Computer Center of Gosplan, 1 and the results of these calculations were used in preplanning. As is well known, the Central Economic Mathematical Institute developed a whole conception of optimal functioning of a socialist economy based on Kantorovich's theory.
However, when it came down to developing a concrete economic plan, the principles of optimal planning would be rejected and the pre-plan developments based on these principles would be put on the shelf. So it was also in the post-Stalin period, when, since the late 1950s, mathematical economics was being granted civic rights.
It must be said that Leonid Kantorovich was certainly far ahead of his time. Before sufficiently powerful and advanced computers became available in the USSR, it was almost impossible to apply his methods at the macroeconomic level. But his proposals, which he began to submit to Gosplan in 1942 (during the war!), were rejected for entirely different reasons. One should give him credit for his persistence: the report of a modest professor of the Yaroslavl Naval Academy was yet discussed in 1943 at a meeting in the office of N. A. Voznesensky, the Chairman of Gosplan. The two main objections were as follows: (1) Kantorovich's method contradicts Marx's labor theory of value, instead borrowing theses of bourgeois theories; and (2) his proposals disagree with the existing planning and statistical indicators and planning practice. After these first objections, Kantorovich had to reply to the same or similar arguments almost for half a century, i.e., almost for the rest of his life. In the mid 1960s, being a member of one of the Lenin Prizes Committees in economics, I assisted at a meeting where all speakers -representatives of conventional economic science -fulminated against awarding the Prize to V. S. Nemchinov, V. V. Novozhilov, and L. V. Kantorovich. Not having at the time enough knowledge of mathematical economics, I did not speak at the meeting, but decided to vote for awarding the Prize, as a token of protest against similar sweeping accusations. The vote was secret, but, since I had to leave early, I gave my ballot to the committee secretary. The secretary looked at the ballot in my presence and gave a whistle. After that I was never more invited to the committee meetings; apparently, I was excluded from it even without being informed. The Lenin Prize was nevertheless awarded, after the intervention of M. V. Keldysh, though with a modified wording.
Of course, under Stalin, the charge of repeating the theses of bourgeois economics was quite sufficient for declaring a scientist an enemy and imprisoning him. Hence there is no difficulty in understanding that many people at that time endeavored to dissociate themselves from Kantorovich, either according to their convictions, or in order to play safe. But in Khruschev's and Brezhnev's time the political situation changed, but the official objections remained the same.
But let us turn back to the discussion on Kantorovich's report in Voznesensky's office in 1943. At that time, Voznesensky was an all-powerful person, not only the chairman of Gosplan, but also a member of Politburo 2 and a vice-chairman of the Council of Ministers. At one time, Stalin regarded him as one of his successors. It was still full five years until he was arrested and shot, and certainly he feared not much. By the way, this was the highest level at which Kantorovich was ever listened to under the Soviet rule. Voznesensky could afford charging his assistants with listening to Kantorovich, regardless of the fact that a year ago his high-rank employees had written a negative report on his proposals. Why?
Apparently, not being blinkered by dogmatic Marxism, he wanted to check whether Kantorovich's proposals contained anything that would allow him to gain favor with Stalin by passing them off as a creation of Gosplan and of his own. It appears that he was attracted by the passage of Kantorovich's private letter to Voznesensky that referred to a prewar Stalin's statement on the necessity of using the law of value in the Soviet economy. For a competent economist, and Voznesensky was a competent economist, this clearly pointed out that the leader wanted to increase the role of prices in planning. And Kantorovich suggested just a new formula for pricing, which promised to produce a greater economic effect and allowed one to improve the demand-supply balance.
But, apparently, after the meeting Voznesensky realized that to address Stalin with Kantorovich's proposals would be running high risks. Relying on prices meant weakening other, purely administrative, methods, weakening centralization, and this could not please Stalin, especially during the war. Hence Voznesensky decided to put Kantorovich's proposals on the shelf till a better occasion, which never occurred. It is not without purpose that Voznesensky did not second the proposal, put forward by some participant after the meeting, to repress Kantorovich as an anti-Marxist, "saboteur," and propagandist of Pareto, whom the same meeting had declared a "favourite" of the fascist dictator Mussolini. One should give credit to Voznesensky: having looked at Kantorovich's proposals closely enough, he did not believe these lies.
But a more serious conclusion from this story is that Kantorovich's model was indeed unacceptable from the viewpoint of the existing planning practice and its institutional set-up. The point is that at that time, as well as later, there existed a huge distance between the theoretical foundations of the Soviet economy and their practical applications. In theory, the ownership of the means of production was collective, they were managed according to the "law of planned development," and the prevailing criterion function was the "fundamental law of socialism," i.e., maximum satisfaction of needs of masses. However, in reality, and this was very well known to all leaders of the Soviet economy and their staff, personal consumption always played a secondary role in the plan, and its volume was determined on a residual basis. And the main criterion function was the maximum provision for state-determined tasks in defence and development of heavy industry. With limited resources, this meant restricting personal consumption by one of the following two methods: either by rising prices, which would be an inevitable result of any course towards demand-supply balance, or by maintaining relatively stable prices and keeping their general increase to a minimum in every possible way, which inevitably plunged the economy into all-round chronic shortages. The political decision to maintain stable prices meant giving up general equilibrium and impossibility to realize Kantorovich's model in principle.
It suffices to look at concrete Kantorovich's proposals contained in his numerous reports and memoranda to make certain that in almost all of them he proposed to struggle against deliberately understated prices, believing that they are the main cause of excessive output of low-quality products under chronic shortages of necessary high-quality goods, inefficient use of equipment, waste of stock and fuel. This point of view was unacceptable, chiefly because it contradicted the policy of maintaining general stability of prices.
I remember a discussion, at a later time, of schemes of transition to optimal planning according to N. P. Fedorenko's reports, with the participation of representatives of Gosplan; now one of the main objections was the "unacceptability" of pricing according to marginal costs, i.e., the full costs of the worst companies in the branch. Clearly, the marginal prices are always higher than the average ones. Not only that the average prices, in the opinion of the opponents of Kantorovich and Fedorenko, were true expressions of the labor value; to reject them would mean to reject not only Marxism, but also stable prices. And this contradicted the "Party and Government" directives and the "Party's concern for people's well-being."
I learned about the methods used in Stalin's time to reach a formal balance between the consumer demand and supply of goods from the former Stalin's Minister of Finance A. G. Zverev and the Minister of Foreign Trade M. A. Menshikov. For example, in order to preserve this balance, Politburo would decide to buy a tanker of alcohol for additional bottling and sale of vodka. By the way, sometimes, at Stalin's suggestion, they would buy not spirit but several "little ships" of oranges. Clearly, with such an approach to planning, Kantorovich's proposals were as misplaced as a sober man's speeches in a pub full of drunks.
This did not prevent Leonid Kantorovich from receiving the Stalin Prize for his achievements in mathematics. But it appears that it was mainly for strikingly exact, for that time, calculations of the critical mass for an A-bomb, in the organization of which Kantorovich was involved. This clearly shows the state priorities of that time.
But in the post-Stalin period, when planning ceased to be so primitive and the economic activity much increased, the Soviet leadership still did not accept Kantorovich's ideas, they even never had been seriously considered by the Government (not to mention Politburo). The unacceptability of "marginal prices" was only one of the reasons. After all, every sufficiently competent planner must realize the cognitive, one might say indicative, importance of solving the dual problem at the macroeconomic level. Even leaving aside the requirements of the optimal plan in production, which might disagree with the directives of Politburo (for instance, towards "chemicalization" of the industry), calculations according to Kantorovich's model might give approximate equilibrium prices for a balanced plan. These prices might be used at least for a partial correction of the most glaring discrepancies between the existing and equilibrium prices. However, Kantorovich's model was not used even for such restricted purposes.
It appears that the main reason was again the discrepancy between the fiction of central balanced planning and the actual mechanism of functioning of the Soviet economy. But now -under Khruschev and Brezhnev -this discrepancy was of another nature than in Stalin's time. There was a distinct tendency towards decentralization within the general structure of central planning. First it manifested itself in the elimination of branch ministries and organization of sovnarkhozes, 3 and then in so-called Kosygin's reform, which, having restored the ministries, somewhat extended the independence of enterprises.
But along with these superficial changes, one essential change occurred. Planning turned into the process of competition and bargaining between economic agents, with underlying struggle for distribution of limited resources at deliberately understated prices. This struggle was carried on by nonmarket methods, with the use of bureaucratic and administrative power, informal relations, and all kinds of other methods. Against this background, the role of Gosplan, Gossnab, 4 Gosstroy, 5 Ministry of Finance, and other central economic institutions was being increasingly reduced to legalizing the allocation of resources obtained in course of bargaining. With such a mechanism of economic functioning, any proportionality or equilibrium was out of question. In addition, there was a growing shadow economy, which could not but flourish owing to chronic shortages, a considerable part of illegal sector existing in the bosom of state enterprises and institutions.
In these circumstances, Kantorovich's model could not be wanted for several reasons. The optimal plan produced by this model was a result of mechanical calculations and would contradict the results of nonmarket competition between economic agents: various ministries, military-industrial complex, etc. The prices established by this plan made resources chargeable and expensive, undermining the existing economic practice based on free and cheap resources. The optimal plan, eliminating shortages, did not leave place for a shadow economy. Thus one observed a paradoxical picture: the system of central planning rejected the only model that provided a basis for its efficient functioning. Rejecting the only, in the absence of market, possible way to optimum and general equilibrium, the system thereby was passing a death sentence on itself. As if Kantorovich, from the planned shore, threw a life buoy to a drowning man, and the latter rejected to take it, either because he did not realize that he was drowning, or because he hoped to reach the market shore safe and sound.
In these circumstances, almost all segments of the elite were against Kantorovich: those who stuck to the fiction of central planning along with the related bureaucratic practice and Marxist theory, as well as those who promoted the breakdown of central planning from inside, trying to escape into the wide spaces of legal capitalist business.
We have already mentioned the reasons why Kantorovich's model was unacceptable for macroeconomic regulation of the western market economy. No wonder that it was not appealed to in course of market reforms in our country. The point is not only that the then Russian leaders were incompetent; though, of course, with their narrow-minded adherence to the neoliberal model, which rejects any active state regulation of economy, even in the Keynesian version, it was impossible even to think of applying the optimal method to the development of economic policy.
I remember a conversation with E. Yasin, who was at that time the Minister of Economy, during his visit to the Rotterdam University, where I worked in the 1990s. I reminded him of the fact that in a number of western countries that got into difficulties after the Second World War, the government indicative planning was used for a long time, which allowed them to focus efforts and resources on restoration and development of key industries. The examples of Norway, France, and especially Japan are well known. Yasin was suspicious of my words and said that the government planning, even indicative, is out of question in Russia. He said that the main goal was to accomplish privatization and let the market start working at full capacity, and the market would solve all problems by itself.
Such a primitive approach is surely one of the reasons why the modern Russian capitalism was created in an oligarchic, predatory, and corrupted version. This is one of the fundamental reasons why our economy suffers from the narrowness of the domestic market, which results from an excessively high share of the gross profit in the gross domestic product (GDP) and excessively low share of wages, which in turn results in the poverty of the majority of population and its low purchasing power. This is also the reason of the excessive profitability of a number of export industries and the chronic shortage of financial resources for development of the most part of other industries. That the Russian economy is far from optimality is beyond doubt. In these circumstances, it is an inexcusable folly to keep on rejecting Kantorovich's model. And this is not only a question of calculation techniques and methods of solving the dual problem. It concerns the very foundations of the understanding of how the modern economy is functioning. Kantorovich's model continues a certain tradition in world economic science, and it is extremely dangerous to ignore it nowadays. Let me briefly recall the history of this question.
In 1920, in the West there appeared a criticism of the very possibility of efficient central planning; it was based on the thesis that, unlike the market, the state, especially if it possesses an exclusive ownership of or control over industrial enterprises, cannot ensure objective pricing that would allow optimal resource allocation. This thesis was argued by the Austrian economist L. von Mises (see [7] ). For a long time nobody in the West contested it. In the Soviet Union it was merely ignored.
But in 1936, the Polish economist Oscar Lange published a counter-criticism of Mises, showing that under certain conditions the state can establish prices that would allow optimization of production. These conditions are as follows. (1) The planning body attentively follows the economic situation in branches, which allows it to establish prices close to the demand-supply equilibrium. If it turns out that the prices are lower or higher than the equilibrium ones (this is determined by sales -formation of surpluses or, on the contrary, shortages), the state adjusts the prices, so that they reach the equilibrium in several iterations. (2) The prices established by the state are compulsory for enterprises. At the same time, enterprises must strictly conform to the following rules: try to cut down the production costs as much as possible and to maintain the volume of production under which the marginal costs are equal to the price. (3) Rates of wages are established by the state so as to maintain the equilibrium between the demand and supply of labor force. Enterprises must hire workers so that the marginal labor productivity be equal to the established salary. (4) The state establishes the rental cost of capital assets so as to ensure a balance between the aggregate demand of capital investments and the resources for accumulation determined by the state. On the whole, Lange's model is a planned emulation of the market under perfect competition. But in this case, the economy is governed not by Adam Smith's "invisible hand," but by the quite visible hand of the state, which acts as a well-informed auctioneer (see [8] and also [9, pp. 496-498] ).
Objections to Lange's scheme appeared in 1940 from F. von Hayek, a future Nobel Prize laureate. Hayek believed that this scheme is unpractical for a number of reasons. (1) The state is not able to keep track of the whole variety of commodities, and hence it is not able to establish optimal prices for all kinds of products that have already appeared in the market or are only going to appear. Even if this is possible as applied to a restricted group of homogeneous bulk commodities (oil, gas, coal, electric power, metals, and other goods, mainly raw materials), it is absolutely impossible as applied to goods and services of personal consumption and instruments of production, the most part of which are by nature individual, subject to constant changes, and dependent on elusive factors, such as mode, change of consumer preferences, perpetual innovations due to technical progress, search for profitable niches, etc. (2) The managers of state enterprises will not conform to the rule of profit maximization unless they receive a considerable part of this profit. (3) The information capacity of the state is larger than that of every individual market agent, however, it is considerably less than the total information possessed by the market agents taken together, i.e., the information created by the market at each moment of time (see [10] ).
Note that the participants of this discussion could not know about Kantorovich's discovery and its further development in applications to macroeconomic planning. Meanwhile, it is quite obvious that Kantorovich, by his theory and practical proposals, proved that Lange's model can be realized in practice and provided a partial answer to Hayek's criticism. With all this, we have no evidence that Kantorovich knew about this discussion and that he intended to argue with its participants. The genius of Kantorovich lies in the fact that he managed to construct his theory proceeding from purely scientific considerations and relying upon a purely mathematical discovery in no means related to any elements of ideology, which were undoubtedly present in the works by Mises, Lange, and Hayek. It is also surprising that even several decades later, after Kantorovich had received the Nobel Prize, the question of how his conception relates to the views of Hayek and other adherents of extreme liberalism even did not arise. It is interesting that in the account of his trip to Sweden for receiving the Nobel Prize, Kantorovich mentions an informal reception with the participation of several American economistsNobel Prize laureates -including Hayek, Leontief, and Samuelson. But, apparently, neither at this reception, nor during other meetings, this issue was never raised. In January 1976, when I worked in USA as the Director of the United Nation Projections and Perspective Studies Branch, I was asked to present L. V. Kantorovich as a new Nobel Prize laureate at the annual meeting of the American Economic Association in Atlantic City. Of course, I put the emphasis on the economic discovery of the laureate. In the discussion, none of the audience, which included T. Koopmans and L. Klein, a future Nobel Prize laureate, mentioned the question of actual Kantorovich's answer to a part of Hayek's argumentation. Meanwhile, this discussion is of major importance nowadays, when the strategy of further economic development of Russia is being determined. The point is that the advantages of developing our economy according to the extreme neoliberal model, which assumes almost total accomplishment of privatization in the nearest future and total orientation towards automatic solution of our problems by the "invisible hand" of the market, are quite doubtful. But if one returns to Hayek's admission that the market does not necessarily lead to the best result in industries producing homogeneous bulk products, it becomes clear that the privatization of these industries was a mistake from which we still suffer.
The most evident example is oil and nonferrous metals. In some years, according to the State Statistical
